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Abstract. In this work we consider the following problem: in a Multi-
Prover environment, how close can we get to prove the validity of an
NP statement in Zero-Knowledge ? We exhibit a set of two novel Zero-
Knowledge protocols for the 3-COLorability problem that use two (local)
provers or three (entangled) provers and only require them to reply two
trits each. This greatly improves the ability to prove Zero-Knowledge
statements on very short distances with very minimal equipment.
1 Introduction
The idea of using distance and special relativity (a theory of motion justifying
that the speed of light is a sort of asymptote for displacement) to prevent com-
munication between participants to multi-prover proof systems can be traced
back to Kilian[1]. Probably, the original authors (Ben Or, Goldwasser, Kilian
and Wigderson) of [2] had that in mind already, but it is not explicitly written
anywhere. Kent was the first author to venture into sustainable relativistic com-
mitments [3] and introduced the idea of arbitrarily prolonging their life span by
playing some ping-pong protocol between the provers (near the speed of light).
This idea was made considerably more practical by Lunghi et al. in [4] who made
commitment sustainability much more efficient. This culminated into an actual
implementation by Verbanis et al. in [5] where commitments were sustained for
more than a day!
As nice as this may sound, such long-lasting commitments have found so
far very little practical use. Consider for instance the zero-knowledge proof for
Hamiltonian Cycle as introduced by Chailloux and Leverrier[6]. Proving in Zero-
Knowledge that a 500-node graph contains a Hamiltonian cycle would require
transmitting 250 000 bit commitments (each of a couple hundreds of bits in
length) and eventually sustaining them before the verifier can announce his
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choice of unveiling the whole adjacency matrix or just the Hamiltonian cycle. For
a graph of |V | vertices, this would require an estimated 200|V |2 bits of communi-
cation before the verifier can announce his choice chall (see Fig. 1). This makes
the application prohibitively expensive. If you use a larger graph, you will need
more time to commit, leading to more distance to implement the protocol of [6].
Either a huge separation is necessary between the provers (so that one of them
can unveil according to the verifier’s choice chall before he finds out the com-
mittal information B used by the other prover while the former must commit all
the necessary information before he can find out the verifier’s choice chall) or we
must achieve extreme communication speeds between prover-verifier pairs. This
would only be possible by vastly parallelizing communications between them at
high cost. Modern (expensive) top-of-line communication equipment may reach
throughputs of roughly 1Tbits/sec. A back of the envelope calculation estimates
that the distance between the verifiers must be at least 100 km to transmit
250 000 commitments at such a rate.
In this work we consider the following problem: in a Multi-Prover environ-
ment, how close can we get the provers in a Zero-Knowledge IP showing the
validity of an NP statement ? We exhibit a set of (3) novel Zero-Knowledge
protocols for the 3-COLorability problem that use two (local) provers or three
(entangled) provers and only require them to communicate two trits each after
having each received an edge and two trits each from the verifier. This greatly
improves the ability to prove Zero-Knowledge statements on very short distances
with very little equipment. In comparison, the protocol of [6] would require trans-
mitting millions of bits between a prover and his verifier before the latter may
disclose what to unveil or not. This implies the provers would have to be very
far from each other because all of these must reach the verifier before the former
can communicate with its partner prover.
Although certain algebraic zero-knowledge multi-prover interactive proofs for
NP and NEXP using explicitly no commitments at all have been presented be-
fore in [7], [8] (sound against local provers) and [9],[10] (sound against entangled
provers), in the local cases making these protocols entanglement sound is abso-
lutely non-trivial, whereas in the entangled case the multi-round structure and
the amount of communication in each round makes implementing the protocol
completely impractical as well. (To their defense, the protocols were not designed
to be practical).
The main technical tool we use in this work is a general Lemma of Kempe,
Kobayashi, Matsumoto, Toner, and Vidick[11] to prove soundness of a three-
prover protocol when the provers are entangled based on the fact that a two-
prover protocol version is sound when the provers are only local. More precisely,
they proved this when the three-prover version is the same as the two-prover
version but augmented with an extra prover who is asked exactly the same
questions as one of the other two at random and is expected to give the same
exact answers.
Our protocols build on top of the earlier protocol due to Cleve, Høyer, Toner
and Watrous[12] who presented an extremely simple and efficient solution to
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Fig. 1. Space-Time diagrams of [6]’s ZK-MIP? for NP. (45◦ diagonals are the speed
of light.)
In the above two diagrams, V1 at a first location sends a random matrix B to P1
who uses each entry to commit an entry of the adjacency matrix Y of G. At another
location, V2 sends a random challenge chall to P2 who unveils all or some commit-
ments as A . At all times, V1 and V2 must make sure that the answers they get from
P1 and P2 come early enough that the direct communication line between V1 and V2
(even at the speed of light) is not crossed. The transition from left to right shows that
increasing the number of nodes (and thus increasing the total commit time) pushes the
verifiers further away from each other. In [6] the distance must increase quadratically
with the number of nodes in the graph.
the 3-COL problem that uses only two provers, each of which is queried with
either a node from a common edge, or twice the same node. In the former case,
the verifier checks that the two ends of the selected edge are of distinct colours,
while in the latter case, he check only that the provers answer the same colour
given the same node. On the bright side, their protocol did not use commitments
at all but unfortunately it did not provide Zero-Knowledge either. Moreover, it
is a well established fact that this protocol cannot possibly be sound against
entangled provers, because certain graph families have the property that they
are not 3-colourable while having entangled-prover pairs capable of winning the
game above with probability one. This was already known at the time when they
introduced their protocol. The reason this protocol is not zero-knowledge follows
from the undesirable fact that dishonest verifiers can discover the (random)
colouring of non-edge pairs of nodes in the graph, revealing if they are of the
same colour or not in the provers’ colouring.
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Fig. 2. Space-Time diagram of our ZK-MIP? for NP. (45◦ diagonals are the speed of
light. )
We are able to remedy to the zero-knowledge difficulty by allowing the provers
to use commitments for the colour of their nodes. However they use these com-
mitments in an innovative way that we call the unveil-via-commit principle (of
independent interest) explained below. For this purpose we use commitments
similar to those of Lunghi et al.[4] but in their simplest form possible, over the
field F3 (or F4 if you insist working in binary), and thus with extremely weak
binding property but also minimal in communication cost: a complete execution
of the basic protocol transmits exactly two node numbers (using only log |V |
bits each) and two trits from verifiers to provers and two trits back from the
provers to verifiers (see Fig. 2). This implies that for a fixed communication
speed, the minimal distance of the provers in our protocol increases logarithmi-
cally with the number of nodes whereas the same parameter grows quadratically
in [6]. Nevertheless, this is good enough to obtain a zero-knowledge version of
the protocol that remains sound against local pairs of provers. The main idea
being that the provers will each commit to the colours of two requested nodes
only if they form an edge of the graph. To unveil the colour of any node, the
verifiers must request commitment of the same node by both provers but using
different randomizations. This way the verifiers may compute the colour of a
node from the linear system established by the two commitments and not by
explicitly requesting anyone to unveil. This is the unveil-via-commit principle
(very similar to the double-spending mechanism of the untraceable electronic
cash of Chaum, Fiat and Naor[13]). We then use the Lemma of [11] to prove
soundness of the three-prover version of this protocol even when the provers are
entangled. A positive side of the protocol of [6], however, is the fact that only
two provers are necessary while we use three. Zero-Knowledge follows from the
fact that only two edge nodes can be unveiled by requesting the same edge to
both provers. Otherwise only a single node may be unveiled. Finally, we show
that even the three-prover version of this protocol retains the zero-knowledge
property: requesting any three edges from the provers may allow the verifiers to
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unveil the colours of a triangle in the graph but never two end-points that do not
form an edge (going to four provers would however defeat the zero-knowledge
aspect).
An actual physical implementation of this protocol is currently being devel-
oped in collaboration with Pouriya Alikhani (McGill), Nicolas Brunner, Se´bastien
Designolle, Weixu Shi, and Hugo Zbinden (Universite´ de Gene`ve).
1.1 Implementations Issues
Traditionally in the setup of Multi-Prover Interactive Proofs, there is a single
verifier interacting with the many provers. However, when implementing no-
communication via spatial separation (the so called relativistic setting) it is
standard to break the verifier in a number of verifiers equal to the number of
provers, each of them interacting at very short distance from their own prover.
The verifiers can use the timing of the replies of their respective provers to judge
their relative distance. In practice, this means that we can implement MIPs under
relativistic assumptions if the verifier are “split” into multiple verifiers, each
locally interacting with its corresponding prover. The verifiers use the distance
between themselves to enforce the impossibility of the provers to communicate:
no message from a verifier can be used to reply to another verifier faster than
the speed of light wherever the provers are located.
Moreover, multi-prover interactive proof systems may have several rounds
in addition to several provers. In general, protocols with several rounds may
cause a treat to the inherent assumption that the provers are not allowed to
communicate during the protocol’s execution. Nevertheless, most of the existing
literature resolves this issue by providing an honest verifier that is non-adaptive.
To simplify this task, most of the protocols are actually single-round. We stick
to these guidelines in this work. Moreover, in order to prove soundness of our
protocols against entangled provers, we use a theorem that is currently only
proven for single-round protocols. The protocols we describe are indeed single-
round and non-adaptive.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notations
Random variables A,B ∈ Γ are said to be equivalent, denoted A = B, if for
all x ∈ Γ , Pr (A = x) = Pr (B = x). The class of probabilistic polynomial-time
Turing machines will be denoted PPT in the following. A PPT Turing machine
is one having access to a fresh infinite read-only tape of random values (uni-
form values from the set of input symbols) at the outset of the computation.
In the following, adversaries will also be allowed (in some cases) to be quantum
machines. The precise ways quantum and classical machines are defined is not
important in the following.
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For M a Turing machine, we denote by M(x) it execution with x on its input
tape (x being a string of the tape alphabet symbols). A Turing machine (quan-
tum or classical) augmented with read-only auxiliary-input tapes and write-only
auxiliary-output tapes is called an interactive Turing machine (ITM). Read-only
input tapes provide incoming messages while the write-only output tapes allow
to send messages. Interactive Turing machine M1 and M2 are said to interact
when for each of them, one of its write-only auxiliary-output tape corresponds
to one read-only auxiliary-input tape of the other Turing machine. An execu-
tion of interactive Turing machines M1, . . . ,Mk on common input x is denoted
[M1 . . .Mk](x). For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, machine Mi accepts the interactive computa-
tion on input x if it stops in state accept after the execution [M1 . . .Mk](x).
When the ITM Mi that accepts a computation is clear from the context, we
say that [M1 . . .Mk](x) accepts when Mi’s final state is accept. In this scenario,
Pr ([M1 . . .Mk](x) = accept) denotes the probability that Mi terminates in state
accept upon common input x. Quantum machines are also interacting through
communication tapes the same way than for classical machines. When a quan-
tum machine M1 interacts with a classical machine M2, we suppose that the
write-only auxiliary tape and the reade-only auxiliary tape of M1 used to com-
municate with M2 are classical. This is the situation we will be addressing almost
all the time in the following. A quantum machine M is also allowed to have a
quantum auxiliary read-only input tape that may contain a part of a quantum
state shared with other machines. This allows to model machines sharing en-
tanglement at the outset of an interactive computation. Henceforth, we suppose
that the (main) input tape of all machines (quantum or classical) is classical.
In the following, G = (V,E) denotes an undirected graph with vertices V and
edges E. If n = |V | then we denote the set of vertices in G by V = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
We suppose that (i, i) /∈ E for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n (i.e. G has no loop). We denote
uniquely each edge in E as (i, j) with j > i. For i ∈ V , let Edges(i) := {(j, i) ∈
E}j<i∪{(i, j) ∈ E}j>i be the set of edges connecting vertex i in G. For e, e′ ∈ E,
we define e ∩ e′ = i ∈ V if e and e′ have only one vertex i ∈ V in common.
When e and e′ have four distinct vertices in V , we set e ∩ e′ = 0. Finally, when
e = e′, we set e∩e′ :=∞. For readability, we use the following special notations:
(a, b) 6=6 (c, d) means a 6= c and b 6= d, while as always, (a, b) 6= (c, d) simply
means a 6= c or b 6= d.
2.2 Non-local Games, Multi-Prover Interactive Proofs, and
Relativistic Proofs
Multi-provers interactive protocols are protocols involving a set of provers mod-
elled by interactive Turing machines, each of them interacting with an interactive
PPT Turing machine called the verifier V. Although all provers may share an
infinite read-only auxiliary input tape at the outset of their computation, they
do not not interact with each other. When the provers are quantum, an extra
auxiliary read-only quantum input tape is given and can be entangled with other
provers at the beginning.
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Definition 1. Let P1, . . . ,Pk be computationally unbounded interactive Turing
machines and let V be an interactive PPT Turing machine. The Pi’s share a
joint, infinitely long, read-only random tape (and an auxiliary reads-only quan-
tum input tape if the provers are quantum). Each Pi interacts with V but cannot
interact with Pj for any 1 ≤ j 6= i ≤ k. We call [P1, . . . ,Pk,V] a k-prover
interactive protocol (k–prover IP).
A [P1, . . . ,Pk,V] k-prover interactive protocol is a multi-prover interactive
proof system for L if it can be used to show V that a public input x is such that
x ∈ L. At the end of its computation, V concludes x ∈ L if and only if it ends
up in state accept. We restrict our attention to interactive proof systems with
perfect completeness since all our protocols have this property.
Definition 2. The k–prover interactive protocol Π = (P1, . . . ,Pk,V) is said to
be a k-prover interactive proof system with perfect completeness for L if there
exists q(n) < 1− 1poly(n) such that following holds:
perfect completeness: (∀x ∈ L) [Pr ([P1, . . . ,Pk,V](x) = accept) = 1],
soundness: (∀x /∈ L)(∀P˜1, . . . , P˜k)
[
Pr
(
[P˜1, . . . , P˜k,V](x) = accept
) ≤ q(|x|)].
The parameter q(|x|) is called the soundness error of Π. Soundness can hold
against classical provers or against quantum provers sharing entanglements. The
former case is called sound against classical provers while to latter is called sound
against entangled provers.
Consider a k–prover interactive proof system Π(x) (with or without perfect
completeness) for L executed with public input x /∈ L. In this situation, Π(x)
defines what is called a quantum game. The minimum value q(|x|) such that for
all P′1, . . . ,P
′
k, Pr
(
[P′1, . . . ,P
′
k,V](x) = accept
) ≤ q(|x|) is often called the classi-
cal value of game Π[x] and is denoted ω(Π(x)) when the provers are restricted
to be classical and unable to communicate with each other upon public input
x. When the provers, still unable to communicate with each other, are allowed
to carry their computation quantumly and share entanglements, we denote by
ω∗(Π(x)) ≥ ω(Π(x)) the minimum value q(|x|) such that for all such quan-
tum provers P′1, . . . ,P
′
k, Pr
(
[P′1, . . . ,P
′
k,V](x) = accept
) ≤ q(|x|). In this case,
ω∗(Π(x)) is called the quantum value of game Π(x). A k–prover interactive
proof system for L is said to be symmetric if V can permute the questions to
all provers without changing their distribution. The following result of Kempe,
Kobayashi, Matsumoto, Toner, and Vidick[11] shows that the classical value of
a symmetric one-round classical game cannot be too far from the quantum value
of a modified game. Given a symmetric one-round two-prover game Π, one can
always add a third prover P3 and V asks P3 the same question than P1 with
probability 12 or the same question than P2 with probability
1
2 . Then, V accepts
if P1 and P2 would be accepted in Π(x) and if P3 returns the same answer than
the one returned by the prover it emulates. We call Π ′(x) the modified game
obtained that way from Π(x).
7
Lemma 1 ([11], Lemma 17). Let Π(x) be a two-prover one-round symmetric
game and let Π ′(x) be its modified version with three provers. If ω∗(Π ′(x)) > 1−ε
then ω(Π(x)) > 1− ε− 12|Q|√ε where Q is the set of V’s possible questions to
a prover in Π.
Lemma 1 remains true for non-symmetric two-prover one-round protocol by
first making them symmetric at the cost of increasing the size of Q. This is
always possible without changing the classical value of the game and by using
twice the number of questions |Q| of the original game (Lemma 4 in [11]).
Let [P1, . . . ,Pk,V] be a k–prover IP. We denote by view(P1, . . . ,Pk,V, x) the
probability distribution of V’s outgoing and incoming messages with all provers
according V’s coin tosses.
Definition 3. Let [P1, . . . ,Pk,V] be a k-prover interactive proof system for L.
We say that [P1, . . . ,Pk,V] is perfect zero-knowledge if for all PPT interactive
Turing machines V˜ there exists a PPT machine Sim (i.e. the simulator) having
blackbox access to V˜ such that for all x,
view(P1, . . . ,Pk, V˜, x) = Sim(x) ,
and both random variables are equivalent. In the following, we allow V˜ to be
a quantum machine but our simulators will always be classical machines with
blackbox access to V˜. If the zero-knowledge condition holds against quantum V˜,
we say that the proof system is perfect zero-knowledge against quantum verifiers.
2.3 Multi-Prover Commitments with Implicit Unveiling
Our multi-prover proof systems for 3COL use a simple 2-committer commit-
ment scheme with a property allowing to guarantee perfect zero-knowledge. In
this section, we give the description of this simple commitment scheme with its
important properties four our purposes.
Assume that provers P1 and P2 share ` values c1, c2, . . . , c` ∈ F where F is
a finite set. V wants to check that these values satisfy some properties without
revealing them all. Assume that F is a field with operations + and ·.
Bit commitment schemes have been used in the multi-prover model ever
since it was introduced in [2]. The original scheme was basically wi := bi · ri+ ci,
a commitment wi to value ci ∈ F using pre-agreed random mask bi ∈R F and
randomness ri 6= 0 provided by V. Kilian[14] had a binary version where each bit
ci := c
1
i ⊕ c2i ⊕ c3i is shared among provers P1 and P2 (and therefore F needs only
to be a group). To commit ci, V samples c
h
i from P1 and c
j
i from P2 at random. If
j = h but cji 6= chi , V immediately rejects the commitment. Otherwise either P1
or P2 may unveil by disclosing c
1
i , c
2
i , c
3
i at a later time. Somehow, bad recollection
of [2]’s scheme lead [15] to a similar but different scheme defining wi := ci ·ri+bi,
a commitment wi to bit ci ∈ {0, 1} using pre-agreed bit mask bi ∈R {0, 1} and
binary randomness ri provided by their corresponding verifiers. Although this
form of commitment is intimately connected to the CHSH game [16] and the
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Popescu-Rohrlich box[17], this proximity is not relevant for the soundness and
the completeness of our protocols, even against entangled provers. Although the
(limited) binding property of these schemes has been established in [3,18,5,19,4,6]
against entangled provers, we only use this commitment scheme against classical
provers, only sharing classical information before the execution of the protocol.
The weak binding property of these schemes against entangled provers does not
allow us to get sound and complete proof systems against these provers. We
shall rather get completeness and soundness against entangled provers using a
different technique from [11] that requires a third prover.
For an arbitrary field F, the commitment scheme produces commitment wi :=
ci ·ri+bi to field element ci ∈ F using pre-agreed field element mask bi (specific to
value 1 ≤ i ≤ `) and random field element ri 6= 0 provided by their corresponding
verifiers. Many results were proven for this specific form of the commitments.
Notice however that the two versions discussed above, wi := bi · ri + ci in the
former case and wi := ci ·ri+bi in the latter have equivalent binding property(left
as a simple exercice). Considering, the former as being the degree-one secret
sharing [20] of ci hidden in the degree zero term, while the latter being the
degree-one secret sharing of ci hidden in the degree one term, we decided to use
the former (original BGKW form) because all the known results about secret
sharing are generally presented in this form. In particular, this form is more
adapted to higher degree generalizations such as wi := ai · r2i + bi · ri + ci being
the degree-two secret sharing of ci hidden in the degree zero term, and so on.
Moreover, this choice turns out to simplify our (perfect) zero-knowledge sim-
ulator. For the rest of this paper, we use wi := bi ·ri+ci where wi, bi, ci ∈ F3 and
ri ∈ F∗3. Provers therefore commit to trits, one value for each node corresponding
to its colour in a 3–colouring of graph G = (V,E). The values shared between
P1 and P2 are therefore, for each node i ∈ V , the colour ci of that node.
Suppose that V asks P1 to commit on the colour ci of node i ∈ V using
randomness r ∈R F∗3. Let w = bi ·r+ci be the commitment returned to V by P1.
Suppose V asks P2 to commit on the colour c
′
j of node j ∈ V using randomness
r′ ∈R F∗3. Let w′ = bj ·r′+c′j be the commitment issued to V by P2. The following
3 cases are possible depending on V’s choices for i, j, r, and r′:
1. (forever hiding) if i 6= j then V learns nothing on neither ci nor c′j since w and
w′ hide ci and c′j with random and independent masks bi ·r and bj ·r′ respec-
tively. Even knowing r, r′ ∈ F∗3, bi ·r and bj ·r′ are uniformly distributed in F3.
2. (the consistency test) If i = j and r = r′ then V can verify that w = w′. This
corresponds to the immediate rejection of V in Kilian’s two-prover commit-
ment described above. It allows V to make sure that P1 and P2 are consistant
when asked to commit on the same value.
3. (implicit unveiling) If i = j and r′ 6= r then V can learn ci (assuming
w = bi · r + ci and w′ = bi · r′ + ci) the following way. V simply computes
ci := 2
−1 ·(w+w′) (Note that over an arbitrary field ci := (wr′−w′r)(r′−r)−1
whenever r 6= r′). Interpreting the meaning of this test can be done when
considering a strategy for P1 and P2 that always passes the consistency test.
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In this case, w = bi · r+ ci and w′ = bi · r′+ ci are satisfied and V learns the
committed value ci.
As long as P1 and P2 are local (or quantum non-local) they cannot distinguish
which option V has picked among the three. The consistency test makes sure
that if P1 and P2 do not commit on identical values for some 1 ≤ i ≤ ` then
V will detect it when V picks the consistency test for commitment w and w′ in
position i.
3 Classical Two-Prover Protocol
First, consider a small variation over the protocol of Cleve et al. presented in
[12]. In their protocol, when P1 and P2 both know and act upon the same valid
3-colouring of G, V asks each prover for the colour of a vertex in G = (V,E).
Consistency is verified when V asks the same vertex to each prover and compares
that the same colour has been provided. The colorability is checked when the
provers are asked for the colour of two connected vertices in G. This way of
proceeding is however problematic for the zero-knowledge condition. V could be
asking two nodes that do not form an edge for which their respective colour
will be unveiled. This certainly allows V to learn something about P1’s and
P2’s colouring. Indeed, repeating this many times will allow V to efficiently
reconstruct a complete colouring. To remedy partially this problem, V is instead
asking each prover the colouring of an entire edge of G. The colouring is (only)
checked when both provers are asked the same edge, while consistency is checked
when two intersecting edges are asked to the provers.
3.1 Distribution of questions
Let G = (V,E) be a connected undirected graph. Let us define the probability
distribution DG = {(p(e, e′), (e, e′))}e,e′∈E for the pair (e, e′) ∈ E × E that
V picks with probability p(e, e′) before announcing e to P1 and e′ to P2. For
e, e′ ∈ E such that e ∩ e′ = 0, we set p(e, e′) := 0 so that V never asks two
disconnected edges in G (this would give no useful information).
The first thing to do is to pick e = (i, j) ∈ E uniformly at random. With
probability  (to be selected later), we set e′ = e, which allows for an edge-
verification test. With probability 1 − , we perform a well-definition test as
follows. With probability 12 , e
′ ∈ Edges(i) uniformly at random and with proba-
bility 12 , e
′ ∈ Edges(j) uniformly at random. In other words, the well-definition
test picks the second edge e′ with probability 12 among the edges connecting
i ∈ V and with probability 12 among the edges connecting j ∈ V . It follows that
for e′ ∈ Edges(i) ∪ Edges(j) with e 6= e′, we have, for e = (i, j) ∈ E,
p(e, e′) =
1− 
2|E|
( |{e′} ∩ Edges(i)|
|Edges(i)| +
|{e′} ∩ Edges(j)|
|Edges(j)|
)
. (1)
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We also get
p(e, e) =

|E| +
1− 
2|E|
(
1
|Edges(i)| +
1
|Edges(j)|
)
≥ |E| . (2)
It is easy to verify that DG is a properly defined probability distribution over
pairs of edges.
3.2 A Variant Over the Two-Prover Protocol of Cleve et al.
Distribution DG produces two edges where the first one is provided to P1 while
the second one is provided to P2. Each prover then returns the colour of each
node of the edge to V. We denote the resulting protocol Π
(2)
std .
Protocol Π
(2)
std [G] : Two-prover, 3-COL.
Provers P1,P2 pre-agree on a random 3-colouring ofG: {(i, ci)|ci ∈ F3}i∈V
such that (i, j)∈E =⇒ cj 6= ci.
Interrogation phase:
– V picks ((i, j), (i′, j′)) ∈DG E×E, sends (i, j) to P1 and (i′, j′) to P2.
– If (i, j)∈E then P1 replies with ci, cj .
– If (i′, j′)∈E then P2 replies with ci′ , cj′ .
Check phase:
– Edge-Verification Test:
if (i, j) = (i′, j′) then V accepts iff ci = ci′ 6= cj′ = cj .
– Well-Definition Test:
if (i, j) ∩ (i′, j′) = h ∈ V then V accepts iff ch = c′h.
The perfect soundness of this protocol is not difficult to establish along the
same lines of the proof of soundness for the original protocol in [12]. On the other
hand, zero-knowledge does not even hold against honest verifiers. V learns the
colour of each node contained in any two edges of G. This is certainly information
about the colouring that V learns after the interaction. To some extend, the
modifications we applied to the 2-prover interactive proof system of [12] leaks
even more to V. In the next section, we show that the 2-prover commitment
scheme, that we introduced in Sect. 2.3, can be used in protocol Π
(2)
std to prevent
this leakage completely.
4 Perfect Zero-Knowledge Two-Prover Protocol
We modify the protocol of section 3.2 to prevent V from learning the colours of
more than two connected nodes in G. The idea is simple, P1 and P2 will return
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commitments for the colours of the nodes asked by V. The implicit unveiling of
the commitment scheme described in section 2.3 will allow V to perform both the
edge-verification and well-definition tests in a very similar way that in protocol
Π
(2)
std . The commitments require V to provide a random nonzero trit for each
node of the edge requested to a prover.
4.1 Distribution of questions
We now define the probability distribution D′G for V’s questions in protocol
Π
(2)
loc [G] defined in the following section. It consists in one edge and two nonzero
trits for each prover:
D′G = {(p′(e, r, s, e′, r′, s′), ((e, r, s), (e′, r′, s′))}e,e′∈E,r,s,r′,s′∈F∗3
upon graph G = (V,E) and where (e, r, s) is the question to P1 and (e
′, r′, s′) is
the question to P2.D′G is easily derived from the distributionDG = {(p(e, e′), (e, e′))}e,e′∈E
for the questions in Π
(2)
std [G], as defined in section 3.1. First, an edge e ∈R E is
picked uniformly at random. Together with e, two nonzero trits r, s ∈R F∗3 are
picked at random. Then, as in DG, with probability  (to be selected later) the
second edge e′ = e, in which case we always set r′ = −r and s′ = −s. This case
allows for an edge-verification test. Finally, with probability 1−, we pick e′ with
probability p(e, e′) and pick r′, s′ ∈R F∗3 so that the couple ((e, r, s), (e′, r′, s′)) is
produced with probability 116p(e, e
′) for all e, e′ ∈ E, and r, s, r′, s′ ∈ F∗3. This will
allow for a well-definition test. A consequence of (1) is that for e = (i, j) ∈ E,
e′ ∈ Edges(i) ∪ Edges(j) with e 6= e′,
p′(e, r, s, e′, r′, s′) ≥ 1− 
16|E|
( |{e′} ∩ Edges(i)|
|Edges(i)| +
|{e′} ∩ Edges(j)|
|Edges(j)|
)
. (3)
According to (2), we also get
p′(e, r, s, e, r, s) =
p(e, e)
4
≥ 
4|E| . (4)
It is easy to verify that D′G is a properly defined probability distribution.
4.2 The Protocol
The protocol is similar to Π
(2)
std except that instead of returning to V the colour
for each node of an edge in G, each prover returns commitments with implicit
unveilings of these colours. If V asks two disjoint edges then V learns nothing
about the values committed by the forever-hiding property of the commitment
scheme. The resulting 2–prover one-round interactive proof system is denoted
Π
(2)
loc .
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Protocol Π
(2)
loc [G] : Two-prover, 3-COL
P1 and P2 pre-agree on random masks bi ∈R F3 for each i ∈ V and a
random 3-colouring of G: {(i, ci)|ci ∈ F3}i∈V such that (i, j) ∈ E =⇒
cj 6= ci.
Commit phase:
– V picks (((i, j), r, s), ((i′, j′), r′, s′)) ∈D′G
(
E × (F∗3)2
)2
, sends ((i, j), r, s)
to P1 and ((i
′, j′), r′, s′) to P2.
– If (i, j) ∈ E then P1 replies wi = bi · r + ci and wj = bj · s+ cj .
– If (i′, j′) ∈ E then P2 replies w′i′ = bi′ · r′+ ci′ and w′j′ = bj′ · s′+ cj′ .
Check phase:
Edge-Verification Test:
– if (i, j) = (i′, j′) and (r′, s′) 6=6 (r, s) then V accept iff wi + w′i 6=
wj + w
′
j .
Well-Definition Test:
– If (i, j) = (i′, j′) and ¬ ((r′, s′) 6=6 (r, s)) then V accepts iff ((wi =
w′i) ∨ (r 6= r′)) ∧ ((wj = w′j) ∨ (s 6= s′)).
– if (i, j) ∩ (i′, j′) = i and r′ = r then V accepts iff wi = w′i.
– If (i, j) ∩ (i′, j′) = j and s′ = s then V accepts iff wj = w′j .
Clearly,Π
(2)
loc satisfies perfect completeness. The following theorem establishes
that in addition to perfect completeness, Π
(2)
loc is sound against classical provers.
Theorem 1. The two-prover interactive proof system Π
(2)
loc is perfectly complete
with classical value ω(Π
(2)
loc [G]) ≤ 1− 112·|E| upon any graph G = (V,E) /∈ 3COL.
Proof. Perfect completeness is obvious. Assume G /∈ 3COL and let us consider
the probability δ that V detects an error in the check phase when interacting with
two local dishonest provers P˜1 and P˜2. Π
(2)
loc is a one-round protocol where the
provers cannot communicate directly with each other nor through V’s questions
since they are independent of the provers’ answers. It follows that the strategy
of P˜1 and P˜2 can be made deterministic without damaging the soundness error
by letting each prover choosing the answer that maximizes her/his probability
of success given her/his question. Therefore, consider a deterministic strategy
as a pair of arrays W `[i, r, j, s] ∈ F23 to be used by prover P˜` for ` ∈ {1, 2}
(i.e. we only care about the entries where (i, j)∈E upon question ((i, j), r, s)).
For z ∈ {1, 2}, W `z [·, ·, ·, ·] is the z-th component of the output pair W `[·, ·, ·, ·].
We let W `1 (i, r, j, s) = W
`
2 (j, s, i, r), as the order in which the vertices of an
edge are given to a prover is irrelevant (V can always choose the same order).
We say that W [i, r] for [i, r] ∈ E × F∗3 is well defined if for all j, k such that
(i, j), (i, k)∈Edges(i) 6= ∅ and ∀s, t ∈ F∗3,
W 11 [i, r, j, s] = W
2
1 [i, r, k, t] . (5)
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For W [i, r] well defined, we set W [i, r] := W 11 [i, r, j, 1] for an arbitrary j such
that (i, j) ∈ Edges(i).
We now lower bound the probability δwdt > 0 that, when W [i, r] is not
well-defined for some i ∈ V and r ∈ F∗3, the well-definition test will detect
it. When (5) is not satisfied , we have W 11 [i, r, j, s] 6= W 21 [i, r, k, t] for some
(i, j), (i, k) ∈ Edges(i). Let e = (i, j) and e′ = (i, k) be these two edges. According
to (3) (and (1) when e = e′), the well-definition test will then detect an error
with probability
Pr (V picks e and e′ with randmoness r, s, t) = p′(e, r, s, e′, r, t) ≥ 1− 
16 · |E||Edges(i)| .
(6)
We can do much better. ConsiderW 11 [i, r,m, u],W
2
1 [i, r,m, u] for (i,m) ∈ Edges(i)
and u ∈ F∗3. For i ∈ V and and value r ∈ F∗3 fixed, three cases can happen:
1. W 11 [i, r,m, u] 6= W 21 [i, r, k, t], in which case e = (i,m) and e′ = (i, k) are
incompatibe for values u and t, or
2. W 11 [i, r, j, s] 6= W 21 [i, r,m, u], in which case e = (i, j) and e′ = (i,m) are
incompatible for values s and u, or
3. W 11 [i, r,m, u] = W
2
1 [i, r, k, t] and W
2
1 [i, r,m, u] = W
1
1 [i, r, j, s], in which case
W 11 [i, r,m, u] 6= W 21 [i, r,m, u] and e = e′ = (i,m) are incompatible for value
u on both sides.
In other words, if (i, j), (i, k) ∈ Edges(i) are such that W 11 [i, r, j, s] 6= W 21 [i, r, k, t]
then for any (i,m) ∈ Edges(i) and for any randomness u ∈ F∗3 associated to node
m, V catches the provers with probability expressed on the right hand side of (6).
It follows that if W [i, r] is not well defined then there are 2 · |Edges(i)| ways for
V to catch the provers and each of these has probability at least 1−16·|E|·|Edges(i)|
to be picked. It follows that,
δwdt ≥ 2(1− ) · |Edges(i)|
16 · |E| · |Edges(i)| =
1− 
8 · |E| .
Now, assume that for all i ∈ E and r ∈ F∗3, W [i, r] is well-defined, which
means that the commitment values produced by the provers satisfy the consis-
tency test. As discussed in section 2.3, when the commitments are consistent,
the unique values committed upon are defined by ci := 2
−1 ·(W [i, r] +W [i,−r]).
Since G /∈ 3COL, two of the nodes must be of the same colour at the end-points
of at least one edge (i∗, j∗) ∈ E. In this case the edge-verification test will de-
tect it when (i∗, j∗) is the edge announced to both provers and if randomness
(r, s) ∈ F∗3 × F∗3 is announced to P1 then (−r,−s) is the randomness announced
to P˜2. Using (4), the probability δevt to detect such an edge when W [i, r] is well
defined for all i ∈ V and r ∈ F∗3 satisfies
δevt ≥ min
e∈E
(p′(e, r, s, e, r, s)) ≥ 
4 · |E| .
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Therefore, the detection probability δ of any deterministic strategy for G /∈ 3COL
satisfies
δ ≥ min(δwdt, δevt) ≥ 1
12 · |E| (maximized at  = 1/3) .
The result follows as the classical value of the game ω(Π
(2)
loc [G]) ≤ 1− δ. 
To prove (perfect) zero-knowledge, it suffices to show that if ((i, j), r, s) and
((i′, j′), r′, s′) are selected arbitrarily, V can determine at most the colours of two
nodes (that form an edge). The commitments prevent a dishonest prover V˜ to
learn the colours of two nodes that are not connected by an edge in G. Proving
this is not very hard and will be done in Section 5.3 for the three-prover case
(although with three provers, V˜ may also learn the colour of three nodes that
form a triangle). The addition of a third prover will allow, using lemma 1, to
get soundness against entangled provers without compromising zero-knowledge.
As shown in [12], their protocol is not necessarily sound against two entangled
provers. We also do not know whether Π
(2)
std is sound against two entangled
provers.
5 Three-Prover Protocol Sound Against Entangled
Provers
The three-prover protocol Π
(3)
qnl, defined below, is identical to Π
(2)
loc except that
P3 is asked to repeat exactly what P1 or P2 has replied. The prover that P3 is
asked to emulate is picked at random by V. An application of lemma 1 allows
to conclude the soundness of Π
(3)
qnl against entangled provers. Zero-knowledge
remains since the only way to provide V with the colours of more than two
connected nodes is if they form a complete triangle of G. This reveals nothing
beyond the fact that G ∈ 3COL to V, since all nodes will then show different
colours.
5.1 Distribution of questions
The probability distribution D′′G for V’s questions to the three provers is easily
obtained from the distribution D′G for the questions in protocol Π(2)loc [G]. V picks
((e, r, s), (e′, r′, s′)) ∈D′G
(
E × (F∗3)2
)2
and sets e′′ = e, r′′ = r, and s′′ = s with
probability 12 or sets e
′′ = e′, r′′ = r′, and s′′ = s′ also with probability 12 .
Defined that way, D′′G is a properly defined probability distribution for V’s three
questions, each one in E × (F∗3)2.
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5.2 The Protocol
Protocol Π
(3)
qnl[G] : Three-prover, 3-COL.
Provers P1,P2, and P3 pre-agree on random values bi ∈R F3 for all
i ∈ V and a random 3-colouring of G: {(i, ci)|ci ∈ {0, 1, 2}}i∈V such that
(i, j)∈E =⇒ cj 6= ci.
Commit phase:
– V picks (((i, j), r, s), ((i′, j′), r′, s′), ((i′′, j′′), r′′, s′′)) ∈D′′G
(
E × (F∗3)2
)3
,
sends ((i, j), r, s) to P1, sends ((i
′, j′), r′, s′) to P2, and sends ((i′′, j′′), r′′, s′′)
to P3.
– If (i, j) ∈ E then P1 replies wi = bi · r + ci and wj = bj · s+ cj .
– If (i′, j′) ∈ E then P2 replies w′i′ = bi′ · r′+ ci′ and w′j′ = bj′ · s′+ cj′ .
– If (i′′, j′′) ∈ E then P3 replies w′′i′′ = bi′′ · r′′ + ci′′ and w′′j′′ = bj′′ ·
s′′ + cj′′ .
Check phase:
Consistency Test:
– If ((i′′, j′′), r′′, s′′) = ((i, j), r, s) then V rejects if (wi, wj) 6= (w′′i′′ , w′′j′′).
– If ((i′′, j′′), r′′, s′′) = ((i′, j′), r′, s′) then V rejects if (w′i′ , w
′
j′) 6= (w′′i′′ , w′′j′′).
Edge-Verification Test:
– if (i, j) = (i′, j′) and (r′, s′) 6=6 (r, s) then V accept iff wi + w′i 6=
wj + w
′
j .
Well-Definition Test:
– if (i, j) ∩ (i′, j′) = i and r = r′ then V accepts iff wi = w′i.
– If (i, j) ∩ (i′, j′) = j and s = s′ then V accepts iff wj = w′j .
In protocol Π
(3)
qnl, after the three questions picked according D′′G by V have been
answered by the the provers, V accepts if and only if the replies of P1 and P2
are accepted in Π
(2)
loc and in addition, P3 gave the same reply than the prover it
emulates.
The soundness of protocol Π
(3)
qnl against entangled provers can easily be shown
a direct consequence of the soundness of protocol Π
(2)
loc against classical provers,
by an application of Lemma 1. Indeed, the soundness error corresponds to the
quantum value of the game when G /∈ 3COL and Π(2)loc is obviously symmetric.
Theorem 2. The three-prover interactive proof system Π
(3)
qnl is perfectly com-
plete and has quantum value
ω∗(Π(3)qnl [G]) ≤ 1−
(
1
25|E|
)4
(7)
upon any graph G = (V,E) /∈ 3COL.
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Proof. Assume G = (V,E) /∈ 3COL. The contrapositive of Lemma 1 indi-
cates any one-round symmetric game Π
(2)
loc [G] with classical value ω(Π
(2)
loc [G]) ≤
1 − δ − 12|Q|√δ is such that the modified game Π(3)qnl[G] has quantum value
ω∗(Π(3)qnl[G]) ≤ 1 − δ. The set Q of questions to each player satisfies |Q| =
4|E|. Theorem 1 establishes that δ + 12|Q|√δ ≥ 112|E| , which implies
√
δ ≥
1
(1+12|Q|)·12·|E| =
1
12|E|+576|E|2 ≥ 1588|E|2 , and the result follows. 
As an immediate consequence of Theorem 2, Ω(|E|4) sequential repetitions of
Π
(3)
qnl produces an interactive proof system for 3COL with negligible soundness er-
ror. Although the resulting proof system can be implemented on short distances,
these many sequential communication rounds need to be performed at high rate
for a given proof to be concluded in reasonable time. A few executions of Π
(3)
qnl
could be run in parallel without having to increase (significantly) the distances
while reducing the number of sequential rounds. However, we don’t know how
the soundness error decreases when Π
(3)
qnl is run only a few times in parallel, even
though the results of Kempe and Vidick, a quantum version of Raz’s parallel
repetition theorem[21], indicate that Ω(|E|4) runs in parallel produces a proof
system with negligible soundness error[22].
5.3 Proof of Perfect Zero-Knowledge
In this section, we prove that protocol Π
(3)
qnl is perfect zero-knowledge. As a
consequence, Π
(2)
loc is also zero-knowledge since everything V˜ sees in Π
(2)
loc can
also be observed in Π
(3)
qnl. The proof of zero-knowledge proceeds using the fact
that a vertex must appear at least twice to have its colour unveiled. This is
the forever hiding property of the commitment scheme described in Section 2.3.
Notice that this would be enough for V˜ to learn something about the colouring
if no extra condition on these three vertices is observed. In fact, we can easily
show that only a few cases of colour disclosure are possible and in each of these
cases, V˜ learns nothing about the colouring that it could not have computed on
its own. V˜ can only learn colour of two connected vertices in G and nothing else
or the colours of three vertices forming a triangle in G. In each of these cases,
V˜ learns random distinct colours for these vertices, which is to be expected by a
valid 3-colouring of G. Let us show why this is enforced by the properties (see
Section 2.3) of the commitment scheme. Remember that in order to learn the
colour assigned to a vertex i ∈ V , V˜ must ask that vertex to at least 2 distinct
provers. Otherwise, V˜ sees only random values returned by the provers. There
are 7 cases of figure depending on how V˜ selects the 3 edges asked. Figure 4
shows all cases. The 3 edges indicated for each case are the one picked by V˜.
The colours associated to white vertices remain hidden by the forever hiding
property of the commitment scheme. For these vertices, the committed values
received from the provers are just random and independent elements in F3. In
each of the 7 cases, the unveiled colours of the vertices are displayed in shade of
grey. We see that the only way to unveil the colour of two vertices (cases 2, 3, 4,
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5, and 6) is when they are connected by an edge, which means that the colours
of both vertices are random but distinct. The only way for V˜ to learn the colour
of 3 distinct vertices is when they form a triangle (case 7). In this case, V˜ learns
three random and distinct colours. Clearly, this is nothing more than something
necessarily true when G ∈ 3COL.
These properties of the commitment scheme allows, for any quantum polynomial-
time dishonest verifier V˜, an easy simulator for view(P1,P2,P3, V˜, G) when
G ∈ 3COL, thus establishing that Π(3)qnl is perfect zero-knowledge.
Theorem 3. The three-prover interactive proof system Π
(3)
qnl is perfect zero-
knowledge against quantum verifiers.
Proof. The simulator Sim, see Fig. 3, is classical given blackbox access to V˜ (and
V˜ can be quantum). Consider an execution Sim(G) upon graph G = (V,E).
It first picks a random permutation col[·] : F3 7→ F3 over three colours, each
corresponding to a distinct element in F3. Table mark[i, r] ∈ {true, false}, for
i ∈ V and r ∈ F∗3, is initialized to false and will indicate if the output of a prover
has already been simulated for vertex i with randomness r. Table count[i], for
i ∈ V , counts the number of times vertex i has been asked so far during the
simulation. Variable c ∈ F3, initialized to 0, indicates the next colour index the
simulator should use when a new colour must be unveiled during the simulation.
V˜ is then invoked to produce questions ((i`, j`), r`, s`) for all provers P`, ` ∈
{1, 2, 3}. Sim now aims at setting the values (w`i` , w`j`) for P`’s commitments. If
(i`, j`) /∈ E, Sim produces no value for (w`i` , w`j`), exactly as P` in Π
(3)
qnl.
When (i`, j`) ∈ E, Sim first produces P`’s commitment w`i` for i` ∈ V and
then produces P`’s commitment w
`
j`
for j` ∈ V . We show how to compute w`i` ,
w`j` is computed similarly mutatis mutandis:
– if mark[i`, r`] then Sim returns the value of w
`
i`
already determined for
the simulation of the commitment of an earlier prover Ph, h < `. This
ensures that both the commitment’s consistency test performed and the
well-definition test are always successful, as in Π
(3)
qnl with honest provers.
– if ¬mark[i`, r`] then Sim has never simulated a commitment of the colour
for vertex i` with randomness r`. The value count[i`] indicates the number
of time prior to this value for `, vertex i` has been asked:
• If count[i`] = 0 then w`i` ∈R F3 is picked uniformly at random, as
it should be when the commitment value for the colour of vertex i` is
observed in isolation.
• If count[i`] = 1 then the colour associated to vertex i` has been commit-
ted to value whi` by an earlier simulated prover Ph, h < ` upon random-
ness −r` (otherwise, mark[i`, r`] = true). Sim sets w`i` = −col[c]−whi` ,
which satisfies the implicit unveiling of random colour col[c] = −w`i` −
whi` . The current colour c is incremented.
The value of count[i`] is increased by one and mark[i`, r`] = true, as the
colour of vertex i` with randomness r` has been committed upon by the
simulated prover P`.
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Simulator Sim(G) : Simulator for V˜’s view upon graph G in Π
(3)
qnl.
All arithmetic below is performed in F3.
1. Let col[·] be a uniform permutation of F3 and let c := 0.
2. ∀i∈V, ∀r∈F∗3, let mark[i, r] := false and count[i] := 0.
3. Run V˜ until it returns ((i1, j1), r1, s1), ((i2, j2), r2, s2), ((i3, j3), r3, s3).
4. For each ` ∈ {1, 2, 3} do:
– Whenever (i`, j`)∈E is provided by V˜, output (w`i` , w`j`) ∈ F3 × F3 to
V˜, both computed as follows:
(a) If ¬mark[i`, r`] then
• If count[i`] = 0 then pick W [i`, r`] ∈R F3.
• If count[i`] = 1 then
∗ W [i`, r`] := −col[c]−W [i`,−r`],
∗ c := c+ 1.
• count[i`] := count[i`] + 1.
(b) If ¬mark[j`, s`] then
• If count[j`] = 0 then pick W [j`, s`] ∈R F3.
• If count[j`] = 1 then
∗ W [j`, s`] := −col[c]−W [j`,−s`],
∗ c := c+ 1.
• count[j`] := count[j`] + 1.
(c) mark[i`, r`] := true, mark[j`, s`] := true.
(d) w`i` := W [i`, r`], w
`
j`
:= W [j`, s`].
Fig. 3. Simulator for Π
(3)
qnl.
Let (w1i1 , w
1
j1
), (w2i2 , w
2
j2
), and (w3i3 , w
3
j3
) be all commitment values simulated
by Sim. As discussed above and shown in Fig. 4, the colours of no more than 3
vertices are unveiled in the process. Sim always unveils as many different colours
there are colours unveiled to V˜. If Sim’s simulated committed values unveils only
the colour of one vertex then that colour is random, as it should in this case
in Π
(3)
qnl. If Sim’s committed values unveils the colours of exactly 2 vertices then
these 2 vertices form an edge in G and the colours are two different random
colours, as it should be in Π
(3)
qnl. Finally, when Sim’s committed values unveil
the colours of exactly 3 vertices then these vertices form a triangle in G. The 3
colours unveiled by Sim to V˜ are different and assigned randomly to each of the
3 vertices, as it is in Π
(3)
qnl. Otherwise, if w
`
i for i ∈ V has been generated with
only one random value then w`i is random and uniform in F3, exactly as it is in
Π
(3)
qnl in the same situation. It is now clear that,
view(P1,P2,P3, V˜, G) = Sim(G) ,
and Π
(3)
qnl is perfect zero-knowledge. 
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Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
Case 5 Case 6 Case 7
Fig. 4. The 7 ways to unveil the colours of at most 3 nodes in Π
(3)
qnl.
6 Conclusion and Open Problems
We have provided a three-prover perfect zero-knowledge proof system for NP
sound against entangled provers that is implementable in some well controlled
environment. In order to make it fully practical, it would be better to find a
protocol with smaller soundness error and also requiring only two provers. Is it
possible? Moreover, we would like to extend our techniques to prove any language
in QCMA or QMA, the natural quantum extensions of NP. We would also
want to prove whether Π
(2)
std is sound against entangled provers. Finally, we
seek a variant of Π
(2)
std that would be sound against No-Signalling provers and a
variant of Π
(2)
loc and Π
(3)
qnl that is both sound against No-Signalling provers and
Zero-Knowledge.
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